G
eneric statements express generalizations about entire categories (e.g., " Birds lay eggs, " " Boys like sports") and are thus a powerful means of transmitting and acquiring information. Above and beyond their role in information transfer, however, generic statements shape children's causal inferences about the generalizations they express. In this chapter, I trace the infl uence of this process on children's theories about the natural and social world, as well as on their motivation and performance in achievement contexts.
Th e ability to divide the world into discrete categories (e.g., chairs, dogs, teenagers) is a key feature of human cognition because it allows us to conceive of indefi nite numbers of distinct individuals as being equivalent in some respects-as being the same kind of thing. Th is assumed equivalence reduces the informational complexity of our environments and, crucially, facilitates broad generalizations across individuals in a category. Such category-wide generalizations are pervasive in everyday thought and behavior. For example, every time people assume that it is safe to sit on a chair they have never used before or to approach a stranger's dog, they are relying on category-wide, or generic , generalizations about chairs and dogs, respectively (i.e., that chairs are sturdy and that dogs are friendly).
Given the central role of these generic generalizations in our cognitive lives, it is natural to ask how they are formed or acquired in childhood. Undoubtedly, children's own interactions with the world are a source. Seeing a particular dog's friendly behavior, for instance, would provide a child with some grounds for extending this feature to the category dog as a whole. However, despite children's apparent willingness to make projections of this sort (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007) , inductive generalizations are by necessity uncertain, insofar as any set of observations can support an infi nite number of alternative generalizations with equal legitimacy (e.g., furry, four-legged things are friendly; Goodman, 1965) .
G E N E R I C S TAT E M E N T S C O N V E Y C AT E G O RY-W I D E C O N T E N T K N OW L E D G E A N D S H A P E C AU S A L T H E O R I E S
Th e uncertainty that is inherent in generalizing from fi rsthand evidence is, by comparison, negligible when children acquire generic facts from other people. In fact, generic statements (or generics) such as "Dogs are friendly" provide the most transparent means of learning generic generalizations because they unambiguously signal that a particular property (e.g., friendliness) applies to an entire kind (e.g., dogs; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995) . Not only do generic statements have the right semantics to convey category-wide generalizations, but they are also (1) common in child-directed speech, accounting for approximately 4% of all utterances addressed to preschool-age children in everyday contexts (Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008) and (2) comprehensible to children as young as 2 or 3 years of age (e.g., Cimpian & Markman, 2008; Cimpian, Meltzer, & Markman, 2011; Gelman & Raman, 2003) . Th is evidence suggests that generic statements may be a substantial source of knowledge about categories for young children.
However, the impact of generic statements on children's conceptual systems is not limited to the transmission of generic facts. Generics also shape children's inferences about the causal source of the novel generic facts conveyed, leading children to view these facts as inherent and natural-as direct by-products of membership in the relevant categories. It is important to note that the causal attributions generated for a fact are part and parcel of how that fact is understood. For example, attributing dogs' friendliness to the biology of their species frames it as a deeper, more essential (Gelman, 2003) feature than attributing it to some external cause such as their typical rearing conditions. In other words, how a new feature is integrated into the network of causal relationships pertinent to a concept (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985) determines how the feature is ultimately understood (e.g., Ahn, Kim, Lassaline, & Dennis, 2000) . Th e evidence reviewed next suggests that generic statements infl uence this process such that the novel facts they convey are, at least under certain circumstances, understood to be relatively deep, essential, and central to the category rather than superfi cial and peripheral.
For example, when 4-and 5-year-old children were presented with generic statements about novel properties of natural kinds (e.g., "Dolphins have a lot of fat under their skin"), the children oft en inferred that these properties must be enabling some important life-sustaining process (e.g., keeping warm: "' cause they dive deep, and deep is cold, and it's warm with big bellies") and are thus an essential aspect of the biology of these kinds (Cimpian & Markman, 2009) . In contrast, when the same novel properties were introduced via a nongeneric statement about an individual (e.g., "She [a dolphin] has a lot of fat under her skin"), they were typically attributed to prior, oft en accidental, causes (e.g., overeating: "probably because it probably ate too much food"). A separate study established that children's use of the generic versus nongeneric linguistic information was not automatic but rather fl exible and context sensitive: When the properties were ones children knew to be generic, presenting them in generic (e.g., "Apples have seeds inside") or nongeneric (e.g., "Th is apple has seeds inside") statements had no eff ect on children's causal attributions. It was only when the properties were novel that the generic versus nongeneric phrasing (e.g., "Apples have ovules inside" vs. "Th is apple has ovules inside") caused children's attributions, and thus their understanding of these novel properties, to diverge.
Along the same lines, when 5-year-olds were presented with generic statements about features of unfamiliar artifact kinds (e.g., "Ludinos have a bent tip"), they typically explained these features in terms of their supposed functions (e.g., "because to pour stuff out"; Cimpian & Cadena, 2010 ). Children's responses in a follow-up experiment indicated that they also believed these features to be a part of the artifacts' intentional design (e.g., ludinos were made with a bent tip), further reinforcing the conclusion that generically conveyed information becomes part of the category core. Importantly, when the same properties were introduced via nongeneric statements (e.g., "Th is ludino has a bent tip"), children's attributions gravitated toward accidental causes instead (e.g., "'cause something stepped on it"). Th us, the essentialist understanding children demonstrated for the generic versions of these properties could not have been a trivial consequence of the content of the properties per se.
Strikingly, generic language leads to the same types of essentialist inferences when it conveys information about social others. In studies, for example, children oft en attributed novel abilities introduced via generic statements (e.g., "Boys/girls are really good at a game called gorp ") to the inherent traits of the relevant social categories (e.g., "because girls are really, really smart" or "'cause boys grow up fast"). When introduced generically, novel biological properties of social others (e.g., "Boys/girls have something called fi brinogen in their blood") were also attributed to inherent traits (e.g., "because they're sensitive"), or else they were thought to enable vital biological functions (e.g., "'cause it can help their blood"). Children's causal inferences diverged again from this pattern when the same information was presented in nongeneric format: Th e novel abilities were ascribed to the eff ort of the individual who was said to possess them (e.g., "because he practiced a lot of times"), while the novel biological properties were oft en thought to be due to an illness or some external agent (e.g., "maybe the bunny bite her"). In sum, children tend to assume that socially relevant information learned from generic statements describes deep, stable, inherent aspects of other people's biological and psychological makeup.
One might wonder, however, if children's talk of deep, inherent causes truly refl ects their essentialized understanding of the facts learned from generic statements, or if it may simply be a side eff ect of having to explain a feature of an entire category. On this alternative view, being asked to explain a new feature of a category (e.g., why boys are good at gorp) might automatically trigger talk about other category-wide features, many of which are inherent and deep (e.g., boys grow up fast); however, such responses would not speak to children's understanding of this new feature per se. To test whether generic language truly shapes external manifestation of underlying traits or talents (e.g., Dweck, 1999) , other properties may not lend themselves to such attributions-for example, properties that seem temporary or accidental (e.g., being dirty; Cimpian & Markman, 2008; Gelman, 1988) . Four-and fi ve-year-olds' causal inferences are sensitive to both the nature of the categories and the content of the properties introduced via generic statements ; Experiments 3 and 4), illustrating the fl exibility of young children's causal learning mechanisms.
C O N S E Q U E N C E S F O R C H I L D R E N ' S AC H I E V E M E N T
In the remainder of this chapter, I review recent evidence that exposure to generic statements aff ects children's achievement-related theories and, consequently, their attitudes and behaviors in achievement settings. Children's theories about what it takes to succeed undoubtedly infl uence their ability to do well in school: Th ose who believe that success is a matter of possessing an inherent trait or talent ( entity theorists) are oft en at a disadvantage relative to those who believe that success is a matter of eff ort and strategies ( incremental theorists), especially when the material is challenging (e.g., Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Mueller & Dweck, 1998) . Because generic language about ability typically leads children to infer that the source of the relevant ability is a trait (e.g., being smart or talented; , it is possible that it would also induce the maladaptive feelings and behaviors associated with an entity theory. Th at is, children might worry about how much of this supposed trait they possess and thus become less likely to enjoy what they are doing; they may avoid challenges so that they can look competent and thus prove that they have the requisite traits; they may have strong negative reactions to mistakes or failures because such negative outcomes imply lack of talent; and so on. By promoting trait attributions, then, generic language may ultimately impair children's motivation and performance.
To test whether generics aff ect motivation, Cimpian (2010) asked 4-to 7-year-old children to play a novel game called gorp , in which they pretended to make diff erent things out of paper. Critically, half of the children heard generic statements about gorp ability (e.g., "Girls/boys are really good at the gorp game"), while the other half heard nongeneric statements (e.g., "Th ere's a girl/boy who is really good at the gorp game"). Children's motivation was assessed with a broad children's theories about the information learned, introduced novel information in either generic or nongeneric format but then asked children to explain the same nongeneric instantiation of this information. For example, although the information about gorp game ability was introduced in generic statements to half the children and in nongeneric statements to the other half, the experimenter went on to show all participants a picture of a single child, tell them that this child was also good at the gorp game, and ask them why they think that is. Th us, the children in the generic and nongeneric conditions were asked to explain exactly the same (nongeneric) fact about a single child. As predicted, their understanding of this child's ability was shaped by how the ability had been originally introduced, such that children who learned about this ability from generic statements were signifi cantly more likely to essentialize it. Th is result provides further evidence for the role of generic statements in the development of children's theories.
It is important to note, however, that the essentializing eff ect of generic language is not deterministic. Framing a new fact generically is not by itself suffi cient to lead to attributions to deep causes. (Aft er all, generic statements can also express facts that do not have a deep causal connection with their kinds, as in "Barns are red"; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006 .) Among the additional factors that aff ect children's causal inferences about linguistically conveyed generic generalizations, two are particularly noteworthy: the nature of the categories that the generalizations are about and the content of the properties being generalized . Especially in the social domain, there is much variability in the extent to which categories are essentialized-that is, in the extent to which they are thought to refl ect deep, natural distinctions (e.g., men vs. women) versus more arbitrary or superfi cial groupings (e.g., Lady Gaga fans vs. Britney Spears fans; see Prentice & Miller, 2007) . Categories that are relatively superfi cial are less likely to support inferences to deep, inherent causes. For example, because Lady Gaga fans are not typically conceptualized as having biological characteristics that distinguish them from fans of other pop stars, it may be less plausible to attribute some new generic fact about them to their biology. Analogously, there is variability in the extent to which properties are compatible with inferences to deep causes. For example, although success at some activity may plausibly be construed as the the high ability of one's own gender seemed to be as damaging as the generic statements about the high ability of the other gender. Th us, even a modest amount of generic language, coming from a person with whom children were unfamiliar, was suffi cient to induce a maladaptive way of thinking about an unfamiliar task, which in turn led children to perform worse than they would have otherwise. In children's daily lives, where children have more of a rapport with the people providing such input and the tasks have higher stakes, the negative eff ect of exposure to generic statements may be even greater.
Th ese fi ndings also speak to children's vulnerability to stereotype information such as that expressed by generic statements about ability. Although the threatening eff ect of familiar societal stereotypes (e.g., about gender and math) has been documented in children around this age (Ambady, Shih, Kim, & Pittinsky, 2001) , this is the fi rst study to show that exposure to a few sentences conveying an entirely novel stereotype is likely to have a similarly debilitating eff ect on children's achievement. It is important to note that, in contrast to Ambady et al. (2001) , the positive stereotypes set up by the generic statements in our study caused children to perform worse, not better. As explained earlier, this counterintuitive result is in fact predicted by our argument that generic statements induce entity-like beliefs that in turn interfere with children's ability to focus constructively on the task at hand. Moreover, this fi nding is compatible with the adult literature on the consequences of activating familiar positive stereotypes: Briefl y, whether positive stereotypes debilitate or facilitate performance appears to depend on the manner of their activation. When they are activated indirectly and subtly (e.g., by subliminally priming participants with words associated with the positively stereotyped identity), positive stereotypes oft en boost confidence and improve performance (e.g., Ambady et al., 2001; Shih, Ambady, Richeson, Fujita, & Gray, 2002; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999) . However, when they are activated directly and blatantly (e.g., by telling Asian American participants that the examination they are about to take was designed to test the stereotype that Asians are good at math), positive stereotypes oft en cause participants to worry about whether they will live up to these stereotypes, which actually impairs their performance (e.g., Brown & Josephs, 1999; Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Shih et al., 2002 ; see also Baumeister, Hamilton, & Tice, 1985) . set of questions that probed, among other things, their perceived competence, their liking for the game, their emotional reactions, and their strategies for fi xing mistakes (see Cimpian, Arce, Markman, & Dweck, 2007) . In line with our prediction, generic language was clearly detrimental to children's motivation. Relative to children in the nongeneric condition, those who were exposed to generics felt less happy and less competent, liked the game less, were less persistent, and so on. Also noteworthy was the fact that generic language impaired motivation regardless of whether it conveyed negative or positive associations between the game and children's own group. Th at is, hearing generic sentences about the high ability of one's group (a positive association) led to lower motivation scores, just as did hearing generic sentences about the high ability of the outgroup (an implied negative association, as when a girl hears that boys are good at gorp). Although counterintuitive, the detrimental eff ect of generic statements about the high ability of one's own group is to be expected if, as we argued, these statements promote entity attributions to stable underlying traits. Th e inference that an inherent talent is the causal source of one's performance is likely to change the whole tenor of the activity, putting children under a spotlight and raising the question of whether they in fact have what it takes to succeed. Our data suggest that this charged atmosphere, which is responsible for the detrimental eff ect on children's motivation, is as likely to arise when one's group is said to possess the requisite talents as when one's group is inferred not to possess them.
Generic statements about ability aff ect not only children's attitudes toward a task but also their very ability to perform it. In a recent study, we taught 4-to 7-year-old children how to play the Finding game , a novel task consisting of multiple trials in which children have to fi nd a complex target shape among a set of alternatives (Cimpian, Mu, & Erickson, 2012) . Children played a baseline round, aft er which they heard either generic ("Boys/girls are really good at the Finding game") or nongeneric ("Th ere's a boy/girl who is really good at the Finding game") statements about ability at this game. Th ey were then asked to play a test round. Th e results were compelling: Although the generic and nongeneric groups were identical in their ability to fi nd the target shapes at baseline, children exposed to generic language performed signifi cantly worse in the test round than children exposed to nongeneric language. Also, as in Cimpian (2010) , the generic statements about as the causal source of one's abilities. Th e fact that even relatively little exposure to generic language may be suffi cient to induce these general, and rather troubling, changes in children's beliefs speaks to the power of this linguistic cue.
C O N C L U S I O N
Generic statements give direct, unambiguous expression to people's knowledge about categories. As such, they are an ideal means of learning about the world. Th eir infl uence, however, extends beyond the acquisition of content knowledge. Th e evidence reviewed here suggests that generic statements are also a major infl uence on children's causal theories, with potential consequences for their achievement.
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